Innovation and Flourishing

In an speech on the occasion of the Iranian New Year, Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei not only expressed his satisfaction with the last year’s government of Mahmud Ahmadinejad, giving him an A+, but he expressed great optimism about the coming years. He seemed confident that all the efforts of the last year should bear some fruit in the next. He scored the government’s performance well enough to predict that the coming year would undoubtedly be a year of “Innovation and Flourishing.”

As has been the pattern with the Islamic Republic, these kinds of speeches indicate not merely a wishful expectation but a suggestion for a future agenda. Whether this tradition is rooted in Islamic teachings or was introduced by the Iranian revolution I have no idea, but I do know that it appeared from the time of the hostage crisis, when Imam Khomeini would “hint” almost every day how the so called “students” would feel, think, and act, and they would do exactly the same by the evening.

And so, innovation started right after his speech. Ahmadinejad, who himself is always full of innovation, came up with something that surpassed whatever innovation an ordinary human being might have come with, i.e., “being appointed for the Divine Management of the world.” I’m sure there are some people more qualified to explain what he means; and while awaiting an explanation, I cannot hide my amazement at the visual as well as comical potential of this phrase.

While he was busy creating this amazing “Divine Management,” he forgot to mention to his vice president that he would change two of his cabinet ministers!

I do not think anyone would be surprised anymore to hear such statements from Ahmadinejad, or even raise a question as to why a president has so many consultants and advisors if he does not consult with them.

However, I was quite surprised when I read that our reformist friend Mohammad Ali Abtahi had “run over his head” at the Supreme Leader’s “signal.” Trying to explain the embarrassing situation that the fellow reformists face in regard to whether to participate in the second round of the elections, knowing that it is not even meant to be a fair election, he wrote in his blog that well, they decided to “participate passively.” (مشارکت غیر فعال)

But the one who did not hear the supreme leader’s speech, or if he heard it, played deaf, was Saffar Herandi, the Minister of Guidance. Without out any apology, and quite insensitive to the Supreme Leader’s signal, he continued the same outdated, boring, routine rhetoric. He said that all the artists who protested against the outdated, non-innovating system of censorship and who said that the situation is worse than before “must be out of their minds not to see all these achievements. We are not here to help creating cinema and film, but the right kind of film.” He then proceeded to call the artists some other not very nice names. These were exactly the sort of words that have been used over and over again for years. Even the insulting words were all copied from what Ahmadinejad has used many times before. Mrs. Elham (Fatemeh Rajabi) had also used them in the most variety of forms, in fact more elaborately and sometimes more graphically many, many times in her blog. Indeed, there was nothing innovative in Harandi’s speech, neither in form nor the meaning, as if he had not turned his radio or TV on in Norooz.

But seriously, a few words with the Supreme Leader. Why not? He called for innovation, didn’t he?

Dear Supreme Leader,

Once, the Prophet Mohammad, peace be upon him, while contemplating, heard God’s Angel’s voice tell him, “Read!” and the Prophet answered: “I cannot.” The Angel then repeated, “Read!” Since it was God’s will, it happened that the Prophet, who was not literate, start reading.

With all due respect Mr. Khamenei, you are not God, and none of those whom you addressed in your speech are the Prophet Mohammad. Innovation is not achieved by orders, even yours. It is a kind of talent given to people by God. Some have it more and some have it less. One can learn to be more creative by various practices, but the kind of creativity that brings about innovation is not achieved even by regular exercises. Look at the former Soviet Union or China, your esteemed models. No art ever came from them since their revolutions except ballet and skating from Russia, and nothing at all from China. As a matter of fact, those arts they had before died away after their revolutions. Forced practices brought about good discipline, but did not produced good creative artists. Their painters are skillful at copying but not at creating. They have good players for various instruments, but not good musician or composers.

Being a tar player yourself, you should know the difference between what Master Ahmad Ebadi or Jalil Shahnaz do and those who have gone to some workshop and training school just to play. I’m sure there was a big difference between Ebadi, even the first time he placed that instrument on his lap, and those who were not and did not become Master Ebadi even after years of playing tar.

As for the flourishing, do you read at all these days? Did you hear of that wonderful article Ahmad Shirzad wrote on his blog and published on Emrooz Online? It was about Imam Khomeini’s project of Jenat, to make a green road from Behesht-e-Zahra to Qom, the multi-million toman project which any student of agriculture could have predicted would fail. The project materialized without proper research and worse without considering the nature of the landscape and soil. Pine trees were planted, dried, planted, dried and replanted and finally the project stopped. The next time you go to Qom, please turn your head to the side and ask your driver about those piles of brown tree logs on the side of the road and ask him how much money was used to “create” that spectacular landscape and ask him why those trees they planted did not flourish. I insist that you should ask your driver and not anybody else. Drivers in Iran are very good and know everything. They are the best sources of news. As a matter of fact, if you need any other information, ask him. Anyhow, I’m sure you know what I’m getting at. Those who executed that project had not even read one of the books that we would study before the revolution called, the Golestan by our wise poet Saadi, to learn that

زمین شوره سنبل بر نیارد، در ان تخم و عمل ضایع مگردان))

“Tulips won’t grow in salt desert, do not waste seeds and labor on it.”

Flourishing, whether human or plant, needs a proper cultivation of the ground and air and proper nourishment. In the present condition, when cabinet ministers obtain their diplomas from shady universities, when their scholarship is published only in commercial encyclopedias whose pages could be bought, when university seats are awards, when students are barred from education as a punishment (yes, this one is really an innovation indeed!), when the main occupation of government is to filter blogs, internets networks, and informational sites, when shutting down newspapers is routine, when rationing seats in the universities on the basis of gender does not bother you, when government decides to publish a different sets of textbooks for boys and girls (who has ever heard of something like that?), you are creating a salt desert in which nothing can grow, nothing better than Ahmadinejad and his cabinet members, and which bears no better fruit than Mrs. Elham’s blog. If that is what you meant by innovation and flourishing, then at least be a little innovative yourself, since they are there already in full bloom and every day open a new bud, so what else do you need?

To read the rest, click here.

Iran's Parliamentary Elections

“Once again, the people of Iran entrusted the Parliament to the fundamentalists.” This was the headline of Keyhan, the government’s publication in Tehran. There was a change to Saturday’s headline, “Under the wondering gaze of the world, the nation’s vote broke the enemy’s back.” Keyhan’s headlines celebrated what appears laughable but, sadly, is true: “A man wrestled with himself and three of them came first,” a revision of a joke in Sepidaran, Ahmad Shirzad’s blog yesterday, reflecting the reality of our parliamentary election.

I was not surprised to read that, once again, the Islamic Republic performed its miracle, once again we made the whole world dumfounded, along with amazed, bewildered, crazed, astonished, shocked, startled, flabbergasted, and any other synonyms one can find in dictionary, although in reality it was only once that we truly shocked the world (and that only by a narrow definition of world): the presidential election of 1997 which brought Mohammad Khatami to power, and we received political plaudits in some quarters twice again, once for Khatami’s second term and again for the last Municipal election of city councils. However during the past two and half years, our president has announced an earthshaking discovery or innovation or astonishing achievement that either “pierced the eyes of enemies” or “punched them in the mouth” or “slapped them in the face” every single week. Given Keyhan’s headlines as such and Ahmadinejad’s proclamation, there should not be left any eyes, tooth, or cheeks undamaged in the world.

While inflation has been rising, unemployment is out of control, and fraud and corruption are skyrocketing (Sardar Zarei’i’s prostitution story certainly beats our Governor’s story though), and housing in at its worst, the government campaign was ticketed on the supreme leader’s aim that this election would “show our unity to our enemy by our participation in a glorious election.”

The Government and the ruling clerics have very clearly defined themselves as “principalist and fundamentalist” without any further qualifications. They never doubted their own legitimacy, tried to prove themselves, or bothered to appeal to any authority to win over this segment of the population whom they appeal to. Since the Islamic Revolution, fundamentalism has self-confidently strode into Iran’s political arena and marched backward to the dawn of Islam and successfully established all the institutions, as well as a suitable discourse, necessary for an Islamic system to function and survive.

If Parliament is used by this government’s leadership, who does not even believe in democracy, it does not surprise me. If Khamenei would craftily call on the people “to participate in election to beat the enemy,” I’m sure he has a proper audience in mind which could be brought into this. Principalists realistically targeted their potential constituency, those who believe in Ahmadinejad’s halo, the imminent ending of the Hidden Imam’s Occultation, and the location of his well, etc., and developed a core of supporters by establishing suitable institutions and discourse among them. Since the first day of his presidency, Ahmadinejad relentlessly has supplied his supporters with what they needed: the articles of superstition, witchcraft, magic, and miracles touched by superficial aspects of the faith which could be found in abundance in every religion. His campaign on this aim started right after his election and continues still. On Friday, March 14, they all returned the favor and cast their ballots for him.

Reformists, in the other hand, like an army full of generals without soldiers, walked onto the battlefield expecting miracles.

When embarrassed, they accused the pricipalists of departing from the Imam’s wishes and ideas.

When defeated, they claim the victory for having 60% of the 104 seats, according to Mohammad Ali Abtahi's blog of March 17.

While 60% did not participate in the elections in Tehran, the stronghold of the reformists, they claimed they are the legitimate heirs to people’s trust.

While the majority of the people are inherently pro-reform, the reform movement failed to reach them and therefore to receive their support.

While there is a vast reservoir of potential supporters in a country of 75 millions, over half of which is younger than 35, the reformists are still awaiting for the birth of a constituency.

While non-fundamentalists and secular Iranians, who could have been absorbed by the reformists, are finding their own language and establishing their own institutions, the reformists still resort to the same language used by the fundamentalists and emulate their institutions, only a bit fancier.

For months, in meeting after meeting, the best they could come up with was President Khatami’s double-talk, like declaration, “Let us participate in election long-sufferingly, yet cheerfully.” I read this statement a few times back and forth trying to make a sense of it. Still it is unclear to me and many whom they addressed this message to and what it meant. Really, who was supposed to vote? Who wants to sent Zahra and Hasan Eshraghi to the Parliament? What for? What sort of reform they will bring to us? Who are they anyhow? The Imam’s dynasty? Turn back another thirty years?

While the reform movements’ most important achievement was sort of establishing and legitimizing the “opposition” to the ruling hardliners in the regime, what is left of it today is just a “long-suffering voice”. There is no trace of opposition left in it.

This election in fact brought the two segments of the society, culturally, politically, nationally, and even religiously head to head. If this conflict manifested itself in the messages sent by their leaders, “let’s vote to beat the enemy” vs. “let’s vote to show we are long-suffering,” clearly the reformist message did not reflect the voice of its potential supporters. When Khatami, regretfully, issued the above-mentioned statements, the real voice of the majority would call for a real challenge to the supreme leader, saying, “No, the Parliament is not a sports gym where we show our muscles to our enemies, the enemies that you created for us; that it is not place for us to rally to display our unity. We are united but not in your fraudulent front. Parliament is our home for our representative to work on our behalf to secure our interest and well-being.”

Obviously there is a vast cultural division in the country that cannot be denied anymore. While the present government and leadership have found its constituency among the masses who are equally happy with having a parliament as wrestling pit and willing to participate in the match, the reformist leaders simply evade the issue and declare failure cheerfully and invited people to “loose with a smile.”

In fact, the Principlists celebrated not only their own victory, but the reformists’ defeat. A simple look at the voting results will give a clear picture. In Tehran, which is the stronghold of the reformists, only 40% of all eligible voters participated and the top candidate was Adel Hadad, rather than any of the reformists. No matter how discriminatory and unjust the voting process was, there is no justification for this failure. Those 60% in Tehran who did not participate in the election could have cast their votes for all the reformist candidates and they could have taken all the Tehran’s seats in a landslide had the reform movement asked them to. Unfortunately, our reformist friends never reached out to the millions of existing Iranian who could have been their strong supporters; rather they addressed some idealized members of their non-existing party.

The party which came to power with 22 million real votes, crying loud that, “We are with you Khatami, we support you Khatami,” was reduced to next to nothing by the policy of being long-suffering and complaining of “others” and those “absent entities.” I sometimes thought they spent most of their time and energy wishing for some exorcists to cast a spell over those “evil entities.” After twelve years they have not been able to establish any unique institutions or discourse of their own to define reform’s nature. It seems they shied away from average middle class secular Iranians, those big “S” people, those big snaky “S” people who constitute at least 60% of voters and stayed home on Friday, those who really would cherish reform but have no place in the reformists’ mind or heart.

Reformists did not even use what was offered them even to a fraction of its potential. The pledges of 250 young and popular actors and actresses could have brought a few million votes to the reformists. (In the last presidential election, in spite of the serious boycott by almost all, Baran Kossary’s campaign brought one million votes for Mustafa Mo’in!) Instead of a clear message with a clear goal and purpose, the reformists send fuzzy, confusing messages. The wide gap between the reform establishment and pro-reform people could be narrowed if the party would have been willing to define the movement in a way to include those millions, and to employ a discourse suitable for this majority, even at the cost of losing some for whom the movement currently appeals in manipulating religious symbols.

Knowing that there are reformists who know of these missing people, I wonder if we, the middle class secular Iranians, who are the backbone of Iranian society, definitely the backbone of civil society, are ever going to be included as part of the society that the reform movement envisions; if at some point the reform movement quits sticking to the paradox that is created, if at some point they admit there is something essentially wrong in Islamic Republic that needs to be reformed; and if it begins to hear us saying, “No, going back to thirty years ago is no good, there were problems then, there is problem now! We want real reform!”

At this point, we are so far from all this that sometimes I wonder if reform is only a nominal party which must exist just to fill up as an alibi, just in the case!

To read the rest, click here.

Barbara Slavin, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies

Barbara Slavin is not the first journalist to become attracted to the puzzling and intriguing Iran’s political system, but is among the very few who admits that she is not so taken with this great revolution. As a matter of fact, she sees signs of decay in the Islamic Republic. In the very first few pages of the book, she says, “Having lived in the Soviet Union in the 1970’s and China a decade later, I knew a decaying revolution when I saw one.” In her twelve chaptered book, she covers her observation of the last ten years of the Islamic Republic with occasional flashbacks to earlier events, and her analysis of its complicated relationship with the United States.

Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies, is a clear departure from the previous Western reviews of the Islamic Republic, which tended not only to keep Iran in a mystical shadow, but accentuated its ambiguity. This book is a pioneer in demystifying what was in three decade intentionally mystified. In each chapter the author tries to explain simply as possible this hybrid of an old civilization and culture, modern technology and education, and religious revolution, and the three dimensions of Islamic Republic of Iran which are woven together and need to be untangled.

Twenty-nine years into the revolution, I did not expect to read anything new in this book, though I found it a very helpful manual in reading Iran’s Islamic Republic system of government. Its best part is the fourth chapter, “The Iranian Square Dance.” She not only draws a diagram of the various councils and assemblies and their place in the hierarchy of Iranian political system, but explains their role and the limits of their power. The collaboration among the various forces of the government and how they take turns whenever they are called for is compared to a square dance with the supreme leader in the middle and the rest around him waiting for their turn to come in the middle. Had this book been written before, we would have come to a much better solution for many of our problems. We would surely not have had the brouhaha over Ahmadinejad in Columbia University, but university president Bollinger might had found a chance to show a little wisdom and treat him more suitably in a way beneficial to all. I wish a copy of this book would find its way to the State Department for future use, if there is any future left for it to be used!

As I’m posting this article, we are all worried over the parliamentary election in late March. At this point I’m counting on “surprises” along the lines of Slavin’s square dance theory. It seems I’m not alone, since Behzad Nabavi, a reformist candidate from Tehran, considering the possibilities of being vetted by the Guardian Council, says “we are used to being nominated every other term.” More likely, he is counting on the square dance theory too.

Another part of the book I find interesting was the chapter on Ahmadinejad, as the president, as a person and, somehow, his becoming who he is. I wish in this chapter Slavin would have talked about the questions surrounding his dubious election. This election was not overseen by any human rights watchdog group and out of 1400 journalist who had gone to Iran to cover the election only handful remained for election day, the rest having to leave the country the day before election since their visas was not renewed as was promised, and the result of the election was what the Ministry of Internal Affairs has provided. None was mentioned.

The four chapters on the “Children of Revolution,” “Opposition,” “Reformists,” and “Mullahs” are very helpful in understanding not only the Islamic Republic but Iran itself.

If it had been written some six or eight years ago, we would not have had Ahmadinejad and his cronies in power today; Washington would have known that the reformists are not “irrelevant.” In these chapters, however, I wish Slavin had departed from the traditional formal journalistic style and been more creative, as she was in chapter four. Though she mentioned that “Iranians have surprised all of us many times and they might do again,” I think working within the framework of her profession did not allow her to go where real changes and surprises in Iran has always been initiated. Universities have been the front line of opposition in Iran in last seventy five years, and as the most important political institution, it deserved a chapter to itself.

Also totally missing was Iranian women as a political institution and not just a gender. Though the Islamic Republic refrains from acknowledging it, the position of women as the speaker of almost all the reform-minded and progressive groups and parties and as a token of credibility even for the fundamentalists indicates their undeniable importance in Iranian politics. They were not looked into as the decisive factors that they are, except as included among “youth” or some other group. The two elections of Mohammad Khatami and the sixth parliament as well as the last municipal election owe their victory to them.

The last three chapters of the book were devoted to the Iran – America relations: The conflicts between the White House and the State Department and between the various groups within them and the similar conflicts between their counterparts in Iran; also, the problem of timing: When Iran was ready, the U.S. was not and vice versa. Each one was dragged its feet to close the deal to delay for a more auspicious time. But two important questions were never raised in this book or elsewhere.

One is the hostility of the hardline cleric towards the Democrats in the United States. Were it not for President Carter, whose campaigned was centered on human rights, particularly in other countries, as he declared in his inaugural speech, the Iranian revolution would have taken a different course. As Mohsen Sazegara admitted to her, “We did not expect such a quick victory.” And indeed, the Islamic Republic owes its victory to this “suddenness” urged by Carter administration, and yet the first response was anger at him. America allowing the Shah to come to the United States was more of a pretext and was used as for domestic political consumption.

The other equally important question is the hostility of Bush administration, and even Clinton’s, towards the reformist Khatami government, in spite of their pro-democracy rhetoric. Though Slavin vaguely referred to it as a lost opportunity and a series of mishaps in the Clinton administration, she never raised the question of whether this was a failure or a matter of deliberate policy. I hope we do not have to wait another two decades to find out about to find out. I pray that the related documents were not among those which Oliver North and Fawn Hall brought to their shredding parties.

Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies undoubtedly helps understand Iranian complex system, although it does not touch the other more important part, American foreign policy. Still I believe, putting aside the political relation of the two countries, that there is something more important involved here. With at least two millions Iranians living in the United States, and several thousands of mixed families and all those born here, it is about time to start a process of ending that animosity. I think the book is successful in that regard. To a great extend, Iranians are alienated from the Islamic Republic, and to great degree she rightly viewed Iranians in opposition to the Islamic rulers. She mentioned even in her talks that if given a fair election Iranian would not elect any of the Islamists to office. The overall impression of Iranians in this book is a more balanced and gentle. They are portrait more sympathetically and humanely. The hostile, angry and unpredictable features which for decades were imposed on Iranian seems be fading away, to be replaced by a more tolerant and friendly one. Undoubtedly if this book is not the beginning of a relationship between Iran and the United States, which I think it is not, surely it is at least the beginning of de-demonizing the grand parents of thousands of American citizens.

To read the rest, click here.